Assessing the G8

The recently concluded G8 summit in Hokkaido in Japan saw the same promises being dished out again. More aid, more funds were announced without accounting much for the previous declarations. But still G8 remains one of the two most important non-institutional forums in the world today, the other being World Economic Forum. Irrespective of ones ideological position, one has to agree that G8 is a crucial international body of negotiations and decision making.

Origins:

The G8 began in 1973 in context of a serious international monetary crisis. It began with USA, West Germany and UK constituting the core group, in the later couple of years Japan (1973), France (1975) and Italy (1975) joined in. USA pushed for Canada’s entry in 1976 so that it did not remain a Europe-dominated club. Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne (under the G8 group at University of Toronto-which is dedicated G8 research facility) have identified three main factors in the international system that provided for the formation of G7/8 (Russia joined it as a full member in 2002 making it G8). These are:

• declining hegemony of the USA and need to have combined management of the world economy by North America, Europe and Japan
• growth of interdependence among the post-industrial democracies
• growing unease about the increasing role played by bureaucracies in tackling world problems, and the need to reassert the primacy or importance of the political leadership.

The G8 summits are held once every year and the members take turns to host the summits. If we look at the issues discussed at the summit since 1976 to 2008, we can identify a wide range. Beginning with management of the world economy, international trade and monetary system; and moving to trans-national issues like drug trafficking, terrorism, crime etc and global humanitarian issues like poverty and environment – all these issue have defined the G8 agenda across the various summits.

The current status

The G8 now has evolved a sophisticated and one can even say an ‘institutionalised’ method of functioning, prompting John Kriton to say that G8 represents ‘prospectively the effective centre of global governance.’ G8 summits see lot of pre-summit and post-summit hectic activity in terms of publications, meetings (at ministerial or secretarial level). The fact that G8 comprises of the most eight most powerful countries of the world, it practically sets the agenda for other multilateral platforms- from WTO to Climate Change Conferences.

Thus it can be seen that the idea behind G8, especially one of ‘global governance’-draws from ‘liberal institutionalist’ position in international relations theory. G8 has also been criticised from the neo-marxist position, Stephen Gill saw it as ‘as a nexus of G7/8 countries at the apex seeking have a neo-liberal management of the world economy. It has also been argued that one major role of G8 has been to maintain ‘group hegemony.’ So when the US hegemony began to decline in 1970s, it sought to continue its influence by replacing ‘individual hegemony’ with ‘group hegemony’. Many critics of G8 see it as ‘vehicle of furthering US interests.’

Over the last few summits there G8 has made serious efforts to involve new countries- the BRIC countries comprising of Brazil, Russia (it is already a member of G8), India and China, of which China and India were considered as the most important players. Other countries that are vying for place at G8 summits are Mexico, South Africa and the ASEAN group. It should be noted that all these countries have been often categorised as ‘emerging economies’ (though differing in degree). Whatever new terminology that G8 may use to describe this new involvement (outreach summit or G8+5), it is very clear that G8 is not going to expand. Moreover, the significance of G8 as the core of global decision making has reduced over the past few years. Countries have believed more in bilateral negotiations or multilateral negotiations (outside any group framework). The recently concluded G8 summit in Japan could not make much headway in addressing issues of climate change, tackling the crisis in Zimbabwe and Sudan and also could not make any breakthrough on the stalled Doha round.

The G8 has always been seen as an ultra-elite group, it has always shown reluctance to involve new countries. Russia for long had to remain an associated member before gaining full membership in 2002. Barring UK, no other summit host in the last three years has shown enthusiasm to involve the ‘outreach’ countries in the discussion process. These countries are normally met over a small ‘breakfast meeting’ and have no involvement in final declaration of the summit. G8 also does not have a transparent rule making and implementation process. There is no mechanism to monitor the progress done on previous declarations.

G8 may now no longer command the power that it commanded earlier and this is a natural outcome shifts in the centres of global economy. It is still a gathering that influences world politics, but it needs to reassess its role to become more active to resolve the current problems. The biggest strength of G8 is that it is not confined to any single issue or area, it can discuss anything it wants. So, rather than being lost in vague declarations, it would be pertinent for G8 to evolve as body to generate activity and direction in resolving disputes.

Sovereignty and the Nuclear Deal

Two terms have defined the contours of the debate on Indo-US Nuclear Deal; these are ‘sovereignty’ and ‘national interest’. The critics of the Deal argue that the deal will compromise the ‘sovereignty’ of India and affect its independent foreign policy. The Government and the supporters of the Deal say that it is ‘national interest’ of India. This post will look at the issue of controversy, their theoretical connotations and how they are being played out in the current controversy especially in context of the recently released ‘Safeguards Agreement’ that India has negotiated with the IAEA.

Sovereignty in the study of International Relations:

Sovereignty encapsulates the rules that define the locus of political authority and set the context for relations between states. The basic meaning of sovereignty is that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community and no other similar parallel authority exists elsewhere. Stephen Krasner in his book, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press) has delineated four ways in which the term sovereignty is used; a) domestic sovereignty: refers to the organisation of public authority within a state and to the level of effective control exercised by those holding authority; b) interdependence sovereignty: refers to the ability of the public authorities to control transborder movements; c) international legal sovereignty: refers to the mutual recognition of states or other entities and d) Westphalian sovereignty: refers to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations.

It is the ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ view that is at the centre of current debate. Can India be assured of non-interference by USA after the Deal is concluded? Will India be coerced to tow US line, especially in the Asia-Pacific region? We will return to these questions later in the post. It should be kept in mind that sovereignty is an artificial and constitutional arrangement that states have evolved over a period of time. The Constructivist view of sovereignty is quite helpful, it sees sovereignty as a socially constructed. Sovereignty is what ‘states make of it’ (this is in line of Wendt’s comment that anarchy is what states make of it).

The Safeguards Agreement

This statement has to be seen in light of the ‘Safeguards Agreement.’ The agreement explicitly does not recognise India as ‘Nuclear Weapon State’ (NWS), but at the same time it recognises the civilian and military nuclear programme of India. Though this falls short India’s hope of getting the NWS status, it de facto serves the purpose. This takes us to the Preamble of the agreement. It allows India to take ‘corrective steps’ to ensure uninterrupted fuel supply to its reactors in case there is disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Without going into the details here, it would be sufficient to say that the Agreement does not spell out what will be the ‘corrective measures’ that India can take recourse to. Thus it is not sure that if foreign fuel supply is cut, then will India’s civilian reactors remain under IAEA safeguard for ‘perpetuity’. It is this ambiguity that can be used to India’s advantage in future if need be.

Here a word of caution is necessary. If we go through the terms of the Hyde Act, it is clear that that the Act seeks to orient India’s foreign policy according to US interest. It wants India to follow USA’s position on Fissile Missile Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Some US Congress members also want India to accept US policy on Iran. These are factors that have to be cautiously and diplomatically warded off by India. Moreover the relationship between the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement has to be clearly defined.

Further, India had to move beyond US and forge nuclear cooperation with France, Russia, UK and possibly even China. This Deal removes the nuclear apartheid that India has suffered for long, and India should make the most of this opportunity.

We return to the question of sovereignty. It is not a static institution, it is constantly redefined by the nation’s governing elite. Hence let us not get unduly concerned about India’s sovereignty be compromised by this Deal. What is of concern is the strategic power play that will follow and how India secures its ‘national interest’ without compromising its sovereignty.

Democracy as a component of Foreign Policy

Article summary: Balancing Interests and Values: India’s struggle with Democracy Promotion, by C. Raja Mohan published in The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2007)

Over the last year there has been a sustained talk about forging an alliance of democracies in the Asia-Pacific region. The main players will be Australia, Japan, USA and India. But this idea has not really picked up and one main reason for it is its anti-China nature. Nonetheless this idea highlighted the fact that ‘democratic polity’ can be a basis foreign policy interaction. This paper by C. Raja Mohan traces the growing importance of democracy as a component of India’s foreign policy. It was ironical that the democracy as a political priority has been largely missing from the foreign policy of the largest democracy. It was the politics of Cold War and the legacy of non-alignment that prevented India from using democracy as value in its interaction with the world.

Cold War Unease

Raja Mohan says “New Delhi’s conspicuous lack of emphasis on democracy in its engagement with the world is largely a consequence of the Cold War’s impact on South Asia and India’s nonaligned impulses in the early years of its independence. It attached more weight to solidarity with fellow developing countries and the defense of its own national security interests without a reference to ideology at the operational level.” He identifies two main factors-external and internal- that prevented India form highlighting the relevance of its democracy to the world.

Externally, the Cold War saw USA backing military ruled-Pakistan and Communist China, while India was moving slowly towards the Soviet camp. Due to the Cold War induced rigid balance of power, India and USA failed to appreciate the common democratic and pluralistic polity which both had. Rather a sense of suspicion and contempt defined the relationship between them, famously termed as ‘estranged democracies’ by Dennis Kux.

Internally, India’s colonial experience was reflected in sustained anti-imperialistic discourse on world affairs. For Nehru, non-alignment was a pragmatic policy to ensure the independence of foreign policy and get the best out of India’s interaction with the world. Hence he never defined non-alignment in anti-West terms. The shift towards Soviet Union and increasing anti-West rhetoric came in the post-Nehru years. In 1970s India also economic populism and left oriented policies which further accentuated the anti-West tone. India began to see itself as a leader of the Third World camp and sought to restructure the West-dominated world.

The shift in 1990s

The end of Cold War caused considerable anxiety in India. At one level, there was the loss of a super-power friend-USSR but more importantly the specter of US dominated uni-polar world loomed large. The initial years saw USA focusing on the Eastern European question. There were also many groups in USA who were raising human rights violation issues in India (in Kashmir and Punjab). The Clinton administration was pushing forward the non-proliferation agenda and this hurt India a lot. And the 1997 Nuclear tests added to the woes.

It was the visit of Clinton in his last year of Presidency in 2000 that marked a paradigm shift in relationship between India and USA. The support of USA to India on the Kargil war issue went a long way in clearing the suspicion.

More importantly the Clinton administration sought India’s help in promoting democracy world wide. But India was not very enthusiastic about this. It rather wanted USA to stop siding with Pakistan on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, and treat New Delhi as an equal with Beijing. Though with limited enthusiasm, India finally agreed to become one of the 10 founding members of the Community for Democracies initiative. The main intention behind this grouping was to “provide an unprecedented opportunity for exchanging experiences, identifying best practices, and formulating an agenda for international cooperation in order to realize democracy’s full potential.”

In its scepticism, India refused to lead an important sub-group-the Caucus of Community of Democracies- of this initiative at the 2000 Warsaw conference. This scepticism is reflected by B. Raman in his paper ‘Community of Democracies’ (2000), “there is no harm in India participating in the forthcoming Warsaw conference on the Community of Democracies … [but] [o]ver-enthusiasm and wishful-thinking that India is now an equal partner of the US in a new jehad for democracy would be unwise. … We should avoid letting ourselves be used by Washington in this venture to advance its interests unless there is a genuine convergence of the interests of the [United States] and India.”

There were three main reasons for India’s scepticism. First it was not ready to give up its traditional manner of mobilising support at the global forum especially the UN. Till now India had always used NAM and the Third World identity to gather support for itself. Second and a more important one, “…New Delhi had not yet resolved the fundamental tension in its own worldview between the notions of sovereignty and intervention. Its own national experience had tended to emphasize the argument that, to be successful, democracy must have a strong internal basis and cannot be enforced from abroad.” (C.Raja Mohan). Finally, the Clinton administration was not too keen on any firm strategic alliance with India in South Asia. The liberal internationalism of the Clinton regime did not totally share India’s enthusiasm of becoming ‘natural allies’ (as the then Prime Minister Vajpayee put it).

It was the Bush administration that took a simpler but strategic view of India’s democracy. Bush looked at India as ‘potential global power’; and reduced (or even dropped) any emphasis on resolution of Kashmir dispute and the issue of non-proliferation. The July 2005 statement which has become famous due the nuclear cooperation component, also made another significant point: India and the United States declared that they “have an obligation to the global community to strengthen values, ideals, and practices of freedom, pluralism, and rule of law” and agreed to assist states seeking to become more open and democratic.” India and US also agreed to support the newly established UN Democracy Fund which has the objective of strengthening democratic institutions and promoting human rights globally.

Habermas on European Union

Jurgen Habermas commenting on the current crisis of integration engulfing European Union calls for the leadership to go to the common people and involve them in the integration process. Here is the link from Habermas’s article from Der Speigel

Embarking upon the Nuclear Path

It seems that the Manmohan Singh government will somehow cobble up the numbers for its survival. Reports from Hokkaido sound promising; most members of NSG have expressed their support for the Nuclear Deal. Thus the Round-1 of the ‘Nuclear bout’ goes to the UPA Government. Now after successfully managing the political game, the Government now has to two different but equally important tasks to perform.

The Electoral Front:

The first one is to sell the Nuclear Deal to the Indian electorate. While it is true that no issue of Indian foreign policy has been debated as extensively as this deal has been; but this debate has been mostly elitist in character. This debate now has move out of the elite domain, the media circles; and come into the actual ‘national’ arena. The common man is still unsure how this deal will benefit him-will it help bring down the fuel prices, will it guarantee less power cuts? The Government now has to meet this challenge and it will be interesting to see how the government can reap electoral benefit from the deal. The people would like to know what this Deal brings to them, with so much resources and energy spent on it.

The Global Front:

As mentioned in the previous blog-post, the nuclear deal is not just about India and USA. It is deal between India and the major powers and more importantly, it is a deal aimed at forging a new global nuclear order. The NPT is proving obsolete in managing the new nuclear game. Apart from the N-5 (USA, China, Russia, UK and France), other countries have either crossed or are ready to cross the nuclear threshold. India and Pakistan have already crossed the nuclear line, while countries like Israel, South Africa and Japan are known to posses nuclear capabilities but have not come out in open. And there is the ‘nuclear-problematic’- North Korea, but it appears that it has been reigned in. Iran is another nuclear threshold state but it cannot clubbed along with North Korea, as Iran is a key player to peace in West Asia. This is how the nuclear map of the world pans out.

Over the last few months we have seen the major powers supporting India’s entry into the nuclear order via the Deal. France, UK and Russia all have urged India to conclude the safeguards agreement with the IAEA (a part of the 123 Agreement). There are reports that apart from the political lobbying, India has also used its corporate muscle to get support. India has contacted global energy giants- GE and Areva to push its case with the NSG countries. The energy giants in turn are looking to benefit from the opening of nuclear commerce with India.

The other challenge before India is to convince the disarmament lobby that India is a responsible nuclear power and a valuable addition to the nuclear order. India has already supported the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and has unilaterally adopted the policy of ‘no- first use’. If Obama wins the race to White House next year, then India will be pressurised to sign NPT and CTBT. But the power equations may not play out as simply as they seem to be. Every country will seek to fulfil its strategic interests in the new global nuclear order. It will be imperative for India to display considerable political will and strategic vision to gain a rightful place in new power play.

Article Review: Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy

The Indo-US Nuclear Deal seems all set to sail through. The politics surrounding this deal has been full of tectonic shifts and twists, and more is to come. The Nuclear Deal politics provides a good opportunity to study how coalition governments deal with foreign policy issues. This question has been dealt with in a recent paper published in Foreign Policy Analysis 2008 (4). Titled-Taking it to the Extreme: The Effect of Coalition Cabinets on Foreign Policy; written by Juliet Kaarbo, University of Kansas and Ryan K. Beasley, Baker University. Using the dataset generated by World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS), the writers seek to analyse the effect of coalition cabinets on foreign policy making. The data used is from 1966 to 1991 and covers 21 countries like Australia, Greece, India, Israel, West Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden. It is to be noted that the countries covered are parliamentary democracies, to meet the requirement of the subject of the study-coalition cabinets. They have covered 26,000 cases of foreign policy behaviour in this study.

The writers first undertake a comprehensive survey of the existing literature on the subject-the effect of coalition politics on foreign policy. There seems to be no agreement among the scholars about the role of the coalition cabinets on foreign policy. The chief disagreement is about the degree and nature of institutional constraints in coalitions. This in turn decides whether the coalition will indulge in aggressive behaviour or peaceful behaviour. One group which sees coalition as highly constrained argues that they generate peaceful behaviour, while others who view coalitions as unconstrained expect more aggressive behaviour.
The expectation that coalitions will engage in peaceful foreign policy primarily rests on the notion that coalitions are highly constrained. Due to the involvement of numerous parties in the coalition, the stability of the government is affected and the government cannot take major policy decisions without long drawn consultations with the coalition partners. Apart from the constraints due the number of parties involved; the constraint is imposed by the ‘coalition agreement’ (or as we know it as the ‘common minimum programme’). The constraints in which coalitions operate presumably dampen aggression. This argument is consistent with the democratic peace theory—the more built-in constraints in democracies (via checks-and-balances, multiple viewpoints, and accountability), the more peace-loving political actors and publics can constrain war-prone leaders. This theory further states that democracies are least likely to go to war with each other. And coalition democracies are more peace-oriented than the other democracies.
There is another group of scholars who disagree, arguing that the institutional and political dynamics of coalitions provide conditions that promote more aggressive foreign policies. This idea challenges the notion that coalitions are highly constrained. Rather they are seen as “constraint free”; this view stems from the diffusion of authority and accountability in coalition governments. To quote Prins and Sprecher, “With coalition governments, the voting public may be less able to attach responsibility to any one party for policy failures. Presumably then, coalition leaders would have greater flexibility in their handling of foreign affairs.”
The other argument of this group is that coalition governments may engage in aggressive behaviour due to their inherent institutional weaknesses. This view states that unstable coalitions may take major foreign policy decision to demonstrate their ability to tackle policy crisis and gain legitimacy at home. The other factor here is that a junior partner in the coalition (but with crucial strength needed for government’s majority) will push the government to aggressive behaviour, while the larger partner (which is a ‘catch-all’ party) will seek to adopt a middle or conciliatory path. But in all this the government will remain susceptible to ‘blackmail’ by its junior partners.

Kaarbo and Beasley argue that the above mentioned propositions are a bit narrow and too general. In their paper, they argue that rather than focusing just on institutional factors, it is important to look at the specific action or behaviour. The other drawback of the existing work on this subject is that it has focussed only on issues of conflict and peace; but foreign policy goes much beyond it. Moreover conflict-based approach always generates extreme behaviour, thus affecting the nature of dataset.
Here I will quote a long paragraph from their paper which conveys the essence of their findings; “coalitions tend to be more extreme in their conflict–cooperation behavior than single-party governments. With event data, however, it is difficult to investigate the possible mechanisms behind this finding. There are several possibilities in the extant literature. First, as senior parties usually have to rely on more extreme, ideological junior parties with whom they are vulnerable to blackmail attempts, coalitions may be “hijacked” by these junior parties, in both extreme directions. Junior parties that are able to influence foreign policy may pull the cabinet toward highly cooperative policies or highly aggressive policies. Second, if coalitions are inherently weak domestically, then they may need to engage in ‘‘high profile’’ foreign policies to gain legitimacy and ⁄ or divert attention from their domestic problems. This argument is usually used to predict more conflictual policies, but one could argue that highly cooperative foreign policies would serve the same purposes. Finally, if coalitions are less constrained than single parties in that the multiple actors make it more difficult for others to assign responsibility to any single party, coalitions may feel more comfortable engaging in extreme endeavours. Again, this argument is usually made to justify the expectation that coalitions are more conflictual, but if both highly conflictual and highly cooperative behavior and high commitment behaviour entail risks, then the diffusion of authority that comes with multiparty coalitions may be behind these risky choices.”
Further Kaarbo and Beasley point out that the results are still mixed, with coalitions triggering extremes in both types of behaviour- conflictual and cooperative. The future research on this question will have to move beyond the institutional dimension and look at behaviour, policy positions and approach of specific partners of the coalition. This paper tackles a crucial question of the role of coalition cabinets in foreign policy, and this question assumes more significance with most of the important players in the world being ruled by coalition governments, like India, Japan, Israel and Turkey. Interestingly the timeline covered in the paper stops in 1991, the year which has marked the full-fledged beginning of coalition governments in India; something that will continue for a long time to come. It would be pertinent to revisit this question again taking into account the post-1991 data.

Some thoughts about the Indo-US Nuclear Deal

Much to the contrary as made out by some leaders and certain sections of the media, the Indo-US Nuclear Deal is not only about India and USA. It is deal between India and the emerging new nuclear order. The new nuclear order is slowly moving away from the parameters of NPT; and Indo-US nuclear deal is one aspect of the future order. Even when we look only at India-US relations, this deal goes much beyond civilian nuclear cooperation. It will mark the beginning of a new chapter of relationship between the two nations which will involve strategic, commercial and military interaction. So as Manmohan Singh Government pats itself for this achievement, it should always be cautious of any possible attempts of arm-twisting by the Americans, and this caution applies to all the future governments also. No clause or terms of the deal will make India a stooge to the Americans or compromise our independence in foreign policy making. The only factor that will maintain India’s independence in foreign policy making is the political will of its leadership and the ability to stand up to Washington.

The Domestic Origins of Non-Alignment

It has become a fashion in media and academic circles to disown the Nehruvian era. This trend has gained currency especially since 1991, when India adopted the economic liberalisation policy. This article seeks to reassess the policy of Non-Alignment, and trace its roots to the domestic politics just after India gained independence.
Many analysts, especially now-a-days tend to dismiss of the Nehruvian foreign policy of Non-Alignment as idealistic, too principled and even utopian. Scores of graduate classes of Indian Politics parrot about the ‘unrealistic’ and ‘non-pragmatic’ nature of India’s stand of non-alignment. It is important to discard this myopic view and understand the real motives that guided the policy of non-alignment.

Foreign policy of any country is determined by certain crucial factors, of which the country’s domestic politics and economic condition is important. Foreign policy is often seen as an extension of the domestic politics. Another related factor is the role various political actors-political parties and pressure groups in determining the foreign policy.
As India embarked upon its journey as an independent nation in 1947, it was crucial to devise a foreign policy that will enable India gain a credible standing at global forum and also help India tackle its problem of economic development and nation-building. In such a scenario, it was the policy of non-alignment that enabled India to orient its foreign policy to meet its specific domestic requirements. India in 1947 adopted a ‘mixed economy’ strategy to build a budding economy. It was combination of the public sector operating the basic, capital-intensive sectors of the economy, while the private sector operating in other sectors. This strategy was crucial to lay the foundation of the economy which has enabled it to race at 9 per cent in the current year.
The policy of non-alignment was in fact a “counterpart to the ‘mixed economy’ strategy.” (Baru, Sanjaya). This ‘instrumentalist’ view of non-alignment policy has been aptly summed up by Polish economist Michael Kalecki when he suggested that non-alignment as foreign policy was a manifestation of the internal set up of the country, and also as a requirement of the domestic economic policy. This ‘instrumentalist’ view differs from the ‘universal’ view of the non-alignment which sees non-alignment as a global movement against ‘power-bloc politics’ and imperialism. While both views are correct, the instrumentalist view has not been spoken about much.
By adopting a ‘non-aligned’ position, India could deal with both the super-powers and other major global players. This is effectively illustrated by the defence procurements during the Nehru years. The Indian Air Force bought 104 Toofani aircraft from France, 182 Hunters and 80 Canberras from UK and 29 AN-12s and 26 Mi-4 helicopters from USSR. (source Chandra, Bipin; India After Independence, pg 151; Penguin). This diversity of sources is also seen in the energy sector with India securing the assistance of West Germany for Rourkela, USSR for Bhilai and Bokaro power plants; and technical assistance from USA for Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) [based on TVC]. Thus India could effectively approach both super-power blocs and gain from them. Non-Alignment gave this flexibility; and helped build the infrastructure for the nascent economy.

The roots of Non-Alignment can be traced to the concept of ‘Congress System’ formulation put forth by Rajni Kothari. Developed in the 1960s, Kothari attempted to describe the competitive party politics in India. It could not be described in existing theoretical models of one-party or two-party or multi party system. The ‘Congress System’ formulation argued that in spite of one party dominance, intra-party and inter-party competition took place. But this competition took place within the confines of the ‘consensus’; the Congress Party occupied the ‘centre’, while opposition within and outside the party was at the margin. This enabled the Congress party to emerge an as ‘umbrella’ organisation which could encompass within itself a wide spectrum of ideologies and opinions.
So, while there was a strong socialist camp advocating strong ties with USSR and total emulation of Soviet Model, there were others who looked upon America as an ally of India in the new global order. The policy of Non-alignment could take into account both these view points, and carry them forward together.

Non-alignment as a principle of foreign policy reflected a great deal of pragmatism. It cannot be categorised as a ‘realist’ approach. Unlike realist approach which focuses solely on ‘pursuit of power’; non-alignment marked an effort to evolve a global order which provided space for every country irrespective of its position and potentialities. So, before we dismiss non-alignment as figment of Nehruvian idealism, we need to consider the period and circumstances in which the policy was evolved. We realise that it was the most practical path that a newly independent nation could chart.

References:

Baru, Sanjaya; The Strategic Consequences of India’s Economic Performance; Academic Foundation

Kothari, Rajni; The Congress System (available on JSTOR)

Sinha, Atish and Mohta, Madhup (eds); Indian Foreign Policy; Foreign Service Institution; 2007