It has become a fashion in media and academic circles to disown the Nehruvian era. This trend has gained currency especially since 1991, when India adopted the economic liberalisation policy. This article seeks to reassess the policy of Non-Alignment, and trace its roots to the domestic politics just after India gained independence.
Many analysts, especially now-a-days tend to dismiss of the Nehruvian foreign policy of Non-Alignment as idealistic, too principled and even utopian. Scores of graduate classes of Indian Politics parrot about the ‘unrealistic’ and ‘non-pragmatic’ nature of India’s stand of non-alignment. It is important to discard this myopic view and understand the real motives that guided the policy of non-alignment.
Foreign policy of any country is determined by certain crucial factors, of which the country’s domestic politics and economic condition is important. Foreign policy is often seen as an extension of the domestic politics. Another related factor is the role various political actors-political parties and pressure groups in determining the foreign policy.
As India embarked upon its journey as an independent nation in 1947, it was crucial to devise a foreign policy that will enable India gain a credible standing at global forum and also help India tackle its problem of economic development and nation-building. In such a scenario, it was the policy of non-alignment that enabled India to orient its foreign policy to meet its specific domestic requirements. India in 1947 adopted a ‘mixed economy’ strategy to build a budding economy. It was combination of the public sector operating the basic, capital-intensive sectors of the economy, while the private sector operating in other sectors. This strategy was crucial to lay the foundation of the economy which has enabled it to race at 9 per cent in the current year.
The policy of non-alignment was in fact a “counterpart to the ‘mixed economy’ strategy.” (Baru, Sanjaya). This ‘instrumentalist’ view of non-alignment policy has been aptly summed up by Polish economist Michael Kalecki when he suggested that non-alignment as foreign policy was a manifestation of the internal set up of the country, and also as a requirement of the domestic economic policy. This ‘instrumentalist’ view differs from the ‘universal’ view of the non-alignment which sees non-alignment as a global movement against ‘power-bloc politics’ and imperialism. While both views are correct, the instrumentalist view has not been spoken about much.
By adopting a ‘non-aligned’ position, India could deal with both the super-powers and other major global players. This is effectively illustrated by the defence procurements during the Nehru years. The Indian Air Force bought 104 Toofani aircraft from France, 182 Hunters and 80 Canberras from UK and 29 AN-12s and 26 Mi-4 helicopters from USSR. (source Chandra, Bipin; India After Independence, pg 151; Penguin). This diversity of sources is also seen in the energy sector with India securing the assistance of West Germany for Rourkela, USSR for Bhilai and Bokaro power plants; and technical assistance from USA for Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) [based on TVC]. Thus India could effectively approach both super-power blocs and gain from them. Non-Alignment gave this flexibility; and helped build the infrastructure for the nascent economy.
The roots of Non-Alignment can be traced to the concept of ‘Congress System’ formulation put forth by Rajni Kothari. Developed in the 1960s, Kothari attempted to describe the competitive party politics in India. It could not be described in existing theoretical models of one-party or two-party or multi party system. The ‘Congress System’ formulation argued that in spite of one party dominance, intra-party and inter-party competition took place. But this competition took place within the confines of the ‘consensus’; the Congress Party occupied the ‘centre’, while opposition within and outside the party was at the margin. This enabled the Congress party to emerge an as ‘umbrella’ organisation which could encompass within itself a wide spectrum of ideologies and opinions.
So, while there was a strong socialist camp advocating strong ties with USSR and total emulation of Soviet Model, there were others who looked upon America as an ally of India in the new global order. The policy of Non-alignment could take into account both these view points, and carry them forward together.
Non-alignment as a principle of foreign policy reflected a great deal of pragmatism. It cannot be categorised as a ‘realist’ approach. Unlike realist approach which focuses solely on ‘pursuit of power’; non-alignment marked an effort to evolve a global order which provided space for every country irrespective of its position and potentialities. So, before we dismiss non-alignment as figment of Nehruvian idealism, we need to consider the period and circumstances in which the policy was evolved. We realise that it was the most practical path that a newly independent nation could chart.
Many analysts, especially now-a-days tend to dismiss of the Nehruvian foreign policy of Non-Alignment as idealistic, too principled and even utopian. Scores of graduate classes of Indian Politics parrot about the ‘unrealistic’ and ‘non-pragmatic’ nature of India’s stand of non-alignment. It is important to discard this myopic view and understand the real motives that guided the policy of non-alignment.
Foreign policy of any country is determined by certain crucial factors, of which the country’s domestic politics and economic condition is important. Foreign policy is often seen as an extension of the domestic politics. Another related factor is the role various political actors-political parties and pressure groups in determining the foreign policy.
As India embarked upon its journey as an independent nation in 1947, it was crucial to devise a foreign policy that will enable India gain a credible standing at global forum and also help India tackle its problem of economic development and nation-building. In such a scenario, it was the policy of non-alignment that enabled India to orient its foreign policy to meet its specific domestic requirements. India in 1947 adopted a ‘mixed economy’ strategy to build a budding economy. It was combination of the public sector operating the basic, capital-intensive sectors of the economy, while the private sector operating in other sectors. This strategy was crucial to lay the foundation of the economy which has enabled it to race at 9 per cent in the current year.
The policy of non-alignment was in fact a “counterpart to the ‘mixed economy’ strategy.” (Baru, Sanjaya). This ‘instrumentalist’ view of non-alignment policy has been aptly summed up by Polish economist Michael Kalecki when he suggested that non-alignment as foreign policy was a manifestation of the internal set up of the country, and also as a requirement of the domestic economic policy. This ‘instrumentalist’ view differs from the ‘universal’ view of the non-alignment which sees non-alignment as a global movement against ‘power-bloc politics’ and imperialism. While both views are correct, the instrumentalist view has not been spoken about much.
By adopting a ‘non-aligned’ position, India could deal with both the super-powers and other major global players. This is effectively illustrated by the defence procurements during the Nehru years. The Indian Air Force bought 104 Toofani aircraft from France, 182 Hunters and 80 Canberras from UK and 29 AN-12s and 26 Mi-4 helicopters from USSR. (source Chandra, Bipin; India After Independence, pg 151; Penguin). This diversity of sources is also seen in the energy sector with India securing the assistance of West Germany for Rourkela, USSR for Bhilai and Bokaro power plants; and technical assistance from USA for Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) [based on TVC]. Thus India could effectively approach both super-power blocs and gain from them. Non-Alignment gave this flexibility; and helped build the infrastructure for the nascent economy.
The roots of Non-Alignment can be traced to the concept of ‘Congress System’ formulation put forth by Rajni Kothari. Developed in the 1960s, Kothari attempted to describe the competitive party politics in India. It could not be described in existing theoretical models of one-party or two-party or multi party system. The ‘Congress System’ formulation argued that in spite of one party dominance, intra-party and inter-party competition took place. But this competition took place within the confines of the ‘consensus’; the Congress Party occupied the ‘centre’, while opposition within and outside the party was at the margin. This enabled the Congress party to emerge an as ‘umbrella’ organisation which could encompass within itself a wide spectrum of ideologies and opinions.
So, while there was a strong socialist camp advocating strong ties with USSR and total emulation of Soviet Model, there were others who looked upon America as an ally of India in the new global order. The policy of Non-alignment could take into account both these view points, and carry them forward together.
Non-alignment as a principle of foreign policy reflected a great deal of pragmatism. It cannot be categorised as a ‘realist’ approach. Unlike realist approach which focuses solely on ‘pursuit of power’; non-alignment marked an effort to evolve a global order which provided space for every country irrespective of its position and potentialities. So, before we dismiss non-alignment as figment of Nehruvian idealism, we need to consider the period and circumstances in which the policy was evolved. We realise that it was the most practical path that a newly independent nation could chart.
References:
Baru, Sanjaya; The Strategic Consequences of India’s Economic Performance; Academic Foundation
Kothari, Rajni; The Congress System (available on JSTOR)
Sinha, Atish and Mohta, Madhup (eds); Indian Foreign Policy; Foreign Service Institution; 2007
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